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 Altered States: Character and Emotional
 Response in the Cinema
 by Murray Smith
 Female teenager: In Hellraiser, when you first see the Cenobytes, your initial re-
 action is, "Oh God, they're awful!" But as they're more on screen, you actually build
 up ... a feeling for them--
 Male teenager: -a relationship with them-
 Female teenager: -you identify with them ... yeah ... you actually feel that Pin-
 head's quite a sad character; he's not a wicked evil man, there's something there
 that's made him like that.
 -Interviewees on Fear in the Dark, Channel 4 show on the horror movie,
 Halloween, 1991.
 The notion of "identification" has long been at the heart of film theory and crit-
 icism and indeed of the narrative arts more generally. It exists as both a term of
 everyday "folk psychology" and as a term of art in several theories of film, the
 senses of which diverge from the everyday notion to varying degrees. The in-
 terest of contemporary film and cultural theory in questions of context and
 reception-and the more sporadic calls for attention to the specifically emo-
 tional responses of spectators--only serves to make the concept more central.
 And yet, as a term of art, the concept remains ill-defined, more of a portman-
 teau word referring to a range of phenomena rather than a singular notion. In
 the following pages, then, I want to address the question, What are the various
 senses of the term "identification," and how can they be developed into a sys-
 tematic explanation of emotional response to fictional characters? My thesis is
 that we need to break the notion down into a number of more precisely defined
 concepts. These concepts are, however, systematically related, together consti-
 tuting what I term the structure of sympathy. Moreover, these basic levels of
 engagement must be supplemented by concepts accounting for "empathic"
 phenomena if a comprehensive theory of "identification" is to be constructed.
 Throughout this essay I place the various levels of engagement or "identification" in
 the context of theories of narrative and narration: I have argued elsewhere that
 characters are salient elements of narrative structure, but we should never lose
 sight of the fact that characters are, nevertheless, parts of larger structures.'
 The approach, then, will be a conceptual one, not a historical review of
 what the term "identification" has meant for different theorists. If this seems an
 arrogant approach, I can only beg the reader's patience. I am well aware of the
 Murray Smith is a lecturer in film studies at the University of Kent at Canterbury. He is
 the author of Engaging Character: Fiction and Emotional Response in the Cinema
 (forthcoming).
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 mass of material on the subject of "identification," in particular those works in-
 fluenced by psychoanalysis. I engage with various other theories at certain
 points in my own argument, and I do address the question of the relationship
 between the (broadly) cognitive model I advocate and the psychoanalytic mod-
 els that have exerted so much influence in film studies. But unless we are to be
 sidetracked into a rather different debate on the metaphysical validity of various
 psychological and philosophical doctrines, I must insist on the right to set out
 my own wares before engaging in competition with my fellow streethawkers.
 "Identification," Imagination, and Narration. Whatever else it is, engaging
 with fiction is a species of imaginative activity, not in the traditional and derog-
 atory sense of the "flight of fancy" but rather in two more complex senses. First,
 in comprehending, interpreting, and otherwise appreciating fictional narra-
 tives, we make inferences, formulate hypotheses, categorize representations,
 and utilize many other cognitive skills and strategies which go well beyond a
 mere registration or mirroring of the narrative material.2 Second, fictions
 prompt and enrich our "quasi-experience," that is, our efforts to grasp, through
 mental hypotheses, situations, persons, and values which are alien to us.3 Our
 imaginative activity in the context of fiction, however, is both guided and con-
 strained by the fiction's narration: the storytelling force that, in any given nar-
 rative film, presents causally linked events occurring in space across time.
 I want to propose that fictional narrations elicit three levels of imaginative
 engagement with characters, distinct types of responses normally conflated un-
 der the term "identification." Together, these levels of engagement comprise a
 structure of sympathy. Most basically, spectators construct characters (a process
 I refer to as recognition). Spectators are also provided with visual and aural in-
 formation more or less congruent with that available to characters and so are
 placed in a certain structure of alignment with characters. In addition, specta-
 tors evaluate characters on the basis of the values they embody and hence form
 more-or-less sympathetic or antipathetic allegiances with them. Thus, the
 larger question I began with can be broken down into the following questions:
 How does a narration generate the characters on which it depends? What is the
 nature of the "filtering" which seems to occur when a particular character be-
 comes the conduit for narrative information? And how does our "attraction to"
 (or "repulsion from") a character affect our experience of the text?
 As the ultimate "organizer" of the text, the narration is the force that gen-
 erates recognition, alignment, and allegiance, the basic components of the
 structure of sympathy. From this perspective, recognition, alignment, and alle-
 giance are intermediary abstractions -neither as concrete as the particular de-
 vices which materially comprise the film nor as abstract as the "reference"
 narration that describes the overarching, apersonal agency of control in the
 text.4 The narration uses the various cinematic techniques in order to produce
 these subsystems, and different techniques become prominent with each of the
 three intermediary structures and different types offilm. Recognition, for example,
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 is usually dependent on a legible and consistent representation of the human
 face and body, a fact that becomes clear in those films that refuse to follow this
 practice. These intermediary abstractions gain their critical raison d'etre via
 their ability to explain those aspects of textual functioning that pertain to our
 responses to fictional characters.
 Central and Acentral Imagining. Our experience of fiction is unlike imagina-
 tion in other contexts (such as daydreaming) in that it is enabled and constrained
 by texts which determine, at the very least, some features of our imagining. Of
 course, every imaginative act is "constrained" in the sense that it depends on
 the resources provided for the subject by his or her experiences within a par-
 ticular culture, but our experience of fiction is peculiar, in the context of imag-
 ination in general, in the degree to which, and the ways in which, it is guided.
 Having outlined the concept of narration, the force which guides and constrains
 the spectator, let us consider further "the beholder's share"-the imaginative
 activity of the viewer.
 In The Thread of Life, Richard Wollheim makes a "fundamental distinc-
 tion, corresponding to a big divide between two modes of imagination": central
 imagining and acentral imagining.5 The distinction can be captured partly
 through linguistic clues. While central imagining is often expressed in the form
 "I imagine ... ," acentral imagining is expressed in the form "I imagine that. .. ."
 If we say, "I imagine jumping from the top of the building," we imply that we
 represent this event to ourselves, as it were, from the "inside." I imagine, for
 example, the view I would have as I fall, the nauseating sensation I would ex-
 perience as my body picks up speed, and so forth.6 Or again, in imagining being
 revolted by the smell of rotten eggs, I recall the characteristic sulfurous stench.
 Central imagining is not, however, limited to such physical and spatiotemporal
 conjectures: it may also involve simulations of the internal states and values of
 the person or character functioning as the vehicle of the central imagining.7 By
 contrast, in imagining that I am revolted by the smell, I need generate no such
 olfactory "image."s In imagining that I jump from the building, I do not repre-
 sent the event to myself with any of the "indexical" marks of the imagined action
 such as transporting myself imaginatively into the appropriate position. I do not
 place myself "in" the scenario so much as entertain an idea, but not from the
 perspective of any character within the scenario.9
 Insofar as our experience of fiction is comprised of acts of imagination
 prompted by fictional texts, we may use Wollheim's distinction in order to pin-
 point a crucial dividing line among models of "identification" (defined broadly
 as attempts to deal with the question of how spectators relate to fictional char-
 acters). Everyday talk about identification tends to depend upon a singular and
 monolithic conception, in which we are said to vicariously experience the
 thoughts and feelings of the protagonist; in Wollheim's terms, unalloyed central
 imagining.'0 While no theory of cinematic identification is so simplistic, the
 stress on experiencing the narrative through an identification with (a) particular
 36 Cinema Journal 33, No. 4, Summer 1994
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 character(s) is carried over into many more elaborate theories. Robin Wood's
 early work, for example, argues that Hitchcock plays with our sympathies, ask-
 ing us to imagine centrally the experiences of various characters. Wood's de-
 fense of Hitchcock is based upon a valorization of both the power and function
 of this aesthetic. Hitchcock's films draw us "in" so completely that we "become"
 the protagonist: "the characters of Psycho are one character, and that character,
 thanks to the identifications the film evokes, is us,"11 and this identification has
 a "therapeutic" effect.
 The stance of semiotic and psychoanalytic film theorists toward the central/
 acentral division is somewhat more complex. Part of the difficulty in placing
 psychoanalytic theory in these terms is the degree of mismatch-if not
 incommensurability -between the two approaches. Metz, for example, makes
 identification with characters "secondary" to the "primary" experience of iden-
 tification with the camera, which is ultimately a form of identification with the
 self. It is not clear how to situate this in terms of the central-acentral distinction.
 On the one hand, identification with characters is subordinated, which seems to
 bring forward an acentral notion; on the other hand, "secondary identification"
 is conceived of as an extension of identification with the self, which brings us
 back to central imagining.
 I cannot be exhaustive in my remarks here, but I would suggest that, ap-
 pearances to the contrary, in much of the work on identification following Metz,
 the emphasis remains on central imagining. For example, Laura Mulvey's influ-
 ential work suggests that classical cinema produces a consistently masculine
 subject position for the spectator, and this occurs largely through identification
 with the male protagonist.12 Taking up Metz's notion of identification across a
 range of characters or "subject positions" (hardly more than a note in The Imag-
 inary Signifier),'3 other psychoanalytic theorists have advanced the idea of
 "multiple identification." Rather than conceiving of the spectator as identifying
 with a single character or subject position, the spectator's locus of identification
 shifts across various characters and noncharacter positions, each representing a
 distinctive role in a given fantasy. Elizabeth Cowie, for example, draws on
 Freud's essay "A Child Is Being Beaten" in order to suggest that in The Reckless
 Moment (Max Ophuls, 1949) the spectator shifts through identifications with
 "the diverse positions [of] father, mother, child, lover, wife, husband, each of
 which are never finally contained by any one character.'"14 Most recently, Carol
 Clover has argued that, in the contemporary horror film, "we are both Red
 Riding Hood and the Wolf; the force of the experience, in horror, comes from
 'knowing' both sides of the story."'15 Of course, in all these approaches, charac-
 ters as such are epiphenomenal: figures of an illusory stability, effects of the un-
 derlying structures of fantasy. Although these models allow for far more
 subjective fluidity than does Mulvey's, and some of them explicitly allow for
 acentral positions, the focus nevertheless remains overwhelmingly on central
 processes. The fundamental experience for the spectator is the perception of
 narrative action through identification with subject positions instantiated by
 Cinema Journal 33, No. 4, Summer 1994 37
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 characters, even if this involves shifts from character to character over the course
 of the film as a whole.
 Reacting to this stress on central imagining in contemporary psychoanalytic
 theory, Noel Carroll has argued unequivocally that spectators never really adopt
 the viewpoint (in a general, rather than a purely optical, sense) of characters.'"
 In Wollheim's terms, fiction furnishes us only with opportunities for acentral
 imagining. Carroll suggests that the very term "identification" is misleading be-
 cause it implies that spectators centrally imagine the fictional events of a narra-
 tive as if they were the protagonist. In Carroll's words, "identification" implies a
 kind of "fusion" of or "mind-meld" between spectator and character. Carroll ar-
 gues that the concept of assimilation more accurately describes the structure of
 interaction between spectators and fictional characters. When Charles, a typical
 spectator, watches a film in which a fictional character is faced by the Green
 Slime,'7 he does not experience an emotion identical to that of the character.
 Rather than experiencing fear of the Slime, Charles experiences anxiety for the
 character as s/he faces the Slime. Charles imagines that the character faces the
 Slime, rather than imagining himself facing the Slime (i.e., Charles does not
 adopt the character's position as a vehicle for an act of central imagining).
 Charles never loses sight of the oblique or acentral relation that he, as a spec-
 tator, maintains toward events and characters in the fictional world:
 In order to understand a situation internally, it is not necessary to identify with the
 protagonist. We need only have a sense of why the protagonist's response is appro-
 priate or intelligible to the situation. With respect to horror, we do this readily
 when monsters appear since, insofar as we share the same culture as the protago-
 nist, we can easily catch-on to why the character finds the monster unnatural. How-
 ever, once we've assimilated the situation from the character's point of view, we
 respond not simply to the monster, as the character does, but to a situation in which
 someone, who is horrified, is under attack.'"
 By its very nature, Carroll seems to argue, our experience of fiction prompts
 acentral imagining (in contrast to fantasies, dreams, or hallucinations, which de-
 pend on central imagining).'9
 Carroll does not deny that spectators may share certain emotional states
 with characters: "we tend to be reviled by the monster in the same way that the
 character is.'"20 Spectators may share both the evaluation and arousal character-
 istic of an emotion with a character. Indeed, Carroll challenges Kendall Walton's
 view that such states are merely "quasi-emotions." The issue at stake here is the
 mechanism by which this "parallel" emotion is generated. For Carroll the mech-
 anism is acentral: there is no sense that we come to share a character's emotion
 through some sort of central imagining. Rather, we comprehend, evaluate, and
 respond to the character's situation and interests. I take this to be the meaning
 of the rather vague verbs ("have a sense of," "catch-on to") emphasized in the
 long quotation above. Sharing basic cultural concerns and symbolic systems
 with a character, we are likely to assess and react to horrific monsters in the
 same way as the character. But, precisely because we share these assumptions,
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 we do not arrive at the "parallel emotion" through centrally imagining ourselves
 as the character in the situation. Rather, we comprehend the character and the
 situation and react emotionally (if we react at all) to the thought of the character
 in that situation (as opposed to the thought of ourselves as the character in that
 situation).
 Carroll's notion of assimilation is explicitly presented as an alternative to
 the concept of identification; more generally, we may regard it as one answer to
 the questions posed above. In general I share Carroll's skepticism toward mod-
 els of spectatorial response to character that place central imagining center
 stage. The structure of sympathy is premised on the notion of acentral imagina-
 tive experience. Unlike Carroll, I find a breadth in the term "identification" that
 is valuable; but I agree that it is loaded, in the sense that it describes only one
 possible relationship between character and spectator-the "folk" or everyday
 scenario, in which the spectator becomes wholly "absorbed in" the experiences
 of the character.
 Yet Carroll misses an important dimension of filmic experience in insisting
 that all responses to characters can be characterized as forms of acentral imag-
 ining. While the structure of sympathy is as a whole an acentral structure, it
 draws on various phenomena which, I shall argue, are forms of central imagin-
 ing, or what psychologists call empathy: emotional simulation, motor and affec-
 tive mimicry, and autonomic reactions like the startle response. These
 phenomena function as "comprehension mechanisms" that feed into the struc-
 ture of sympathy, working with other cognitive processes (perception, infer-
 ence, schematic processing) in the construction of characters and narrative
 situations but may also function as a subsystem at odds with the structure of
 sympathy. One of the key mechanisms for arriving at the kind of acentral assess-
 ments Carroll posits may be a form of imaginative "simulation" of the mental
 states of characters, that is, a form of central imagining. While such simulation
 may not be necessary, it is not uncommon. A comprehensive theory of specta-
 torial response to character must, therefore, incorporate these phenomena in
 addition to the more familiar cognitive, acentral processes that Carroll believes
 exhaustively describe the nature of our responses to character. As my space is
 limited, I will restrict myself to examining just one of these empathic mecha-
 nisms, affective mimicry, in the context of the analysis of The Man Who Knew
 Too Much (Alfred Hitchcock, 1956) below.
 The Structure of Sympathy. We now need to outline the three levels of en-
 gagement (recognition, alignment, and allegiance) that comprise the structure
 of sympathy and the interrelations among them before mobilizing them in an
 analysis of The Man Who Knew Too Much. Before I define in more detail the
 components of the structure of sympathy, however, a word of clarification on
 their status. Each concept, in one sense, describes a kind of narrative system
 that relates to character. I have endeavored, though, to frame the definitions in
 such a way as to emphasize the cooperative activity of the spectator that works
 Cinema Journal 33, No. 4, Summer 1994 39
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 with these narrative systems. In a fuller sense, then, the concepts of recogni-
 tion, alignment, and allegiance are not just inert textual systems but responses,
 neither solely in the text nor solely in the spectator. This caveat is in part de-
 signed to distinguish my model of spectatorial engagement from "hypodermic"
 models, in which the spectator is conceptualized as the passive subject of the
 structuring power of the text. The narratological work presented here is an at-
 tempt to understand the ways in which texts produce or deny the conditions
 conducive to various levels of engagement, rather than the ways they enforce
 them.
 Recognition describes the spectator's construction of character, the percep-
 tion of a set of textual elements, in film typically cohering around the image of
 a body, as an individuated and continuous human agent. Recognition does not
 deny the possibility of development and change, since it is based on the concept
 of continuity, not unity or identity. Recognition requires the referential notion
 of the mimetic hypothesis; that is, the appeal we must make in engaging with a
 text to aspects of real-world experience, like assumptions concerning human
 agents (e.g., individual human agents typically have only one body)-as-
 sumptions which can of course be revised according to nonmimetic information
 (e.g., in this fictional world, individual agents have two bodies, not one). Rec-
 ognition is not, therefore, simply a function of a self-enclosed text (in whatever
 medium). While understanding that characters are artifices and literally no
 more than collections of inert, textually described traits, we assume that these
 traits correspond to analogical ones we find in persons in the real world, until
 this is explicitly contradicted by a description in the text, forcing us to revise a
 particular mimetic hypothesis.21 Characters, and fictional worlds in general,
 rely upon this process in order to be mentally represented at all. The mimetic
 hypothesis underpins more complex engagements built upon recognition; for
 example, we would not find ourselves attracted to (and so could not become
 allied with) an inert bundle of traits. We conceive of characters as integral, dis-
 crete textual constructs. Just as persons in the real world may be complex or
 entertain conflicting beliefs, so may characters; but as with persons, such inter-
 nal contradictions are perceived against the ground of (at least) bodily discrete-
 ness and continuity.
 Recognition has received less attention than any other level of engagement
 in studies concerned with character and/or "identification," probably because it
 is regarded as "obvious." Certainly, in most films, it is rapid and phenomeno-
 logically "automatic." The importance of the level becomes apparent in those
 films that undercut or retard recognition. Films as different as Arsenal (Alex-
 ander Dovzhenko, 1929), The End (Christopher Maclaine, 1953), The Sus-
 pended Vocation (Raul Ruiz, 1977), and That Obscure Object of Desire (Luis
 Bufiuel, 1977) all problematize the process of recognition, but to ends rather
 more diverse than can be captured by a single, gross function such as "distan-
 ciation" or the "laying bare of the device." Even the poststructuralist might wel-
 come an explanation of recognition. If characters are really such fragmentary
 40 Cinema lournal 33, No. 4, Summer 1994
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 bundles of traits, then some significant mental activity must give rise to our ex-
 perience of them as continuous wholes.
 Alignment describes the process by which spectators are placed in relation
 to characters in terms of access to their actions and to what they know and feel.
 The concept is akin to the literary notion of "focalization," Gerard Genette's
 term for the way in which narratives feed story information to the reader
 through the "lens" or "filter" of a particular character. I propose two interlock-
 ing functions, spatial attachment and subjective access, as the most precise
 means for analyzing alignment.22 Spatial attachment concerns the capacity of
 the narration to restrict itself to the actions of a single character or to move more
 freely among the spatio-temporal paths of two or more characters. Subjective
 access pertains to the degree of access we have to the subjectivity of characters,
 a function that may vary from character to character within a narrative. Together
 these functions control the apportioning of knowledge among characters and
 the spectator; the systematic regulation of narrative knowledge results in a
 structure of alignment.
 Perceptual alignment- optical POV and its aural equivalent-is regarded
 as simply one resource of the narration in controlling alignment. A common er-
 ror in a great deal of criticism that focuses on "identification" is the privileging
 of POV, on the grounds that it provides us with uniformly greater access to char-
 acters' states than other devices. Such an assumption both overstates the impor-
 tance of POV to "identification" and at the same time occludes the wide variety
 of other functions that POV may perform (for example, concealing the identity
 of the looker, a function it often performs in the horror film).3 POV neither
 entails nor is essential to recognition, alignment, or allegiance. All three levels
 of structure can operate without POV, and the use of POV does not necessarily
 result in our recognizing a character, being aligned with a character, or being
 allied with a character.
 Allegiance pertains to the moral and ideological evaluation of characters by
 the spectator. Here we are perhaps closest to what is meant by "identification"
 in everyday usage, where we talk of "identifying with" both persons and char-
 acters on the basis of a wide range of factors, including attitudes related to class,
 nation, age, ethnicity, and gender ("I could really identify with Virgil Tibbs,
 having experienced that kind of racial hostility myself"). Allegiance depends
 upon the spectator having what s/he takes to be reliable access to the character's
 state of mind, understanding the context of the character's actions, and having
 morally evaluated the character on the basis of this knowledge. Evaluation, in
 this sense, has both cognitive and affective dimensions. For example, being an-
 gry or outraged at an action involves categorizing it as undesirable or harmful to
 someone or something and being affected-affectively aroused-by this cate-
 gorization. On the basis of such evaluations, spectators construct moral struc-
 tures, in which characters are organized and ranked in a system of preference.
 Many factors contribute to the process of moral orientation (the narrational
 Cinema Journal 33, No. 4, Summer 1994 41
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 process through which a moral structure is produced) and hence to allegiance:
 character action, iconography, and music are particularly salient.24
 A word or two further should be said regarding the theory of emotion that
 the notion of allegiance depends upon. The theory argues that emotions proper
 have both a cognitive component and an affective component; fear, for example,
 is characterized as a judgment or "cognition" that something endangers the in-
 terests of the subject, held in an intentional relationship with a state of affective
 arousal in the subject. Different emotions are thus discriminable according to
 the specific cognitive component, or identificatory evaluation: "that student
 just insulted me," in the case of anger, as opposed to "I've hurt that student," in
 the case of remorse. It is important to see how this account "thickens" cognitive
 accounts of spectatorial response, which are often thought to be incapable of
 handling emotional responses. Moreover, this view of emotion overturns the
 Platonic antinomy between reason and the emotions, an antinomy which, it
 might naively be thought, cognitivism perpetuates.25
 Neither recognition nor alignment nor allegiance entails that the spectator
 replicate the traits or experience the thoughts or emotions of a character. Rec-
 ognition and alignment require only that the spectator understand that these
 traits and mental states make up the character. With allegiance we go beyond
 understanding by evaluating and responding emotionally to the traits and emo-
 tions of the character in the context of the narrative situation. Again, though, we
 respond emotionally without replicating the emotions of the character. For ex-
 ample, in watching a character perform certain actions and in seeing the char-
 acter adopt a certain kind of posture and facial expression, we may infer that the
 character is in a certain kind of mental state or possesses certain traits - say, an-
 ger as the state, or brutality as the trait. These inferences contribute both to our
 recognition of the character and to the pattern of alignment, since we are deal-
 ing here partly with a question of subjective access, but such inferences in no
 way mandate that the spectator be moved to think or feel (let alone behave) in
 the same way. If we do go on to be moved by engaging with the character on the
 level of allegiance, our responses are at a tangent to those of the character: they
 are acentral, sympathetic rather than empathetic. In order to respond emotion-
 ally in this way, the perceiver must first understand the narrative situation, in-
 cluding the interests, traits, and states of the characters.26 We will see how this
 contrasts with empathic emotional responses that do not require such an under-
 standing.
 It is in view of these conditions that recognition, alignment, and allegiance
 comprise a structure of sympathy, where that term is distinguished from empa-
 thy precisely in virtue of its acentrality. In understanding "why the protagonist's
 response is appropriate or intelligible to the situation,'"27 it is only necessary
 that we have what we take to be, at that moment in the course of the narrative,
 reliable information about the traits and states of the character and about the
 situation in which the character is placed. In sympathizing with the protagonist
 I do not simulate or mimic his or her occurrent mental state. Rather, I under-
 42 Cinema Journal 33, No. 4, Summer 1994
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 stand the protagonist and his or her context, make a more-or-less sympathetic
 or antipathetic judgment of the character, and respond emotionally in a manner
 appropriate to both the evaluation and the particular context of the action.
 The Man Who Knew Too Much. Much of the critical and theoretical comment
 on the work of Hitchcock has centered on the notion of "identification," as in
 the work of Robin Wood, for example. In particular, critics have observed that
 his films sometimes elicit a paradoxical identification with villainous, unsympa-
 thetic characters; Wood, for example, writes of Hitchcock "playing identification
 techniques against the natural gravitation of our sympathetic concern."28 For
 these reasons, Hitchcock's films provide a particularly good test case for the the-
 ory of character engagement. The Man Who Knew Too Much will serve primar-
 ily to illustrate the distinctiveness of the structures of allegiance and alignment;
 for reasons of space, my remarks on recognition and empathic responses will be
 relatively brief.
 The Man Who Knew Too Much may be divided into two broad movements.
 Jo and Ben McKenna, an American couple, are vacationing in Morocco with
 their son, Hank. In the course of their travels, they befriend a Frenchman,
 Louis Bernard, and a retired English couple, the Draytons. Bernard is mur-
 dered. With his last words he attempts to pass information regarding a plot to
 assassinate a French minister to Ben McKenna. The Draytons, it emerges, are
 in some way connected with the murder of Louis Bernard; they kidnap Hank in
 order to silence Ben McKenna. The Draytons hold Hank in captivity in En-
 gland; the McKennas pursue them largely without the aid of the police. Hank is
 located in a London embassy and is recovered via a ruse in which Jo McKenna,
 a professional singer, entertains guests at the embassy with a (lengthy) rendition
 of"Que Sera, Sera." Recognizing the song, Hank whistles it, enabling his father
 to locate him.
 In the first movement, which extends up to the beginning of the McKen-
 nas' hunt for Hank in Britain, we recognize the major characters, and we are
 aligned exclusively (with a few brief exceptions) with the McKennas. At the
 same time, this first movement establishes a moral structure that ensures our
 sympathies are directed toward the McKennas. In the second movement, the
 structure of alignment develops so as to disperse our attention across several
 characters, rather than exclusively attaching us to the McKennas. Moreover,
 while the McKennas remain the moral center of the film, the moral structure of
 the film fragments in other ways during the second movement. Let us consider
 these developments in more detail.
 The first movement of the film both attaches us to the McKennas and pro-
 vides us with access to their subjectivities. That is, the narration follows the spa-
 tiotemporal path of the McKennas, only occasionally breaking away to reveal
 action occurring in a distinct location; and the McKennas are subjectively trans-
 parent, revealing their inner states through actions, expressions, and language.
 By contrast, when the narration does break momentarily from the McKennas
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 (just prior to the stabbing of Louis Bernard, for example), the characters we wit-
 ness are largely opaque: we see their actions but have no access to their subjec-
 tivities. (Indeed, the film persistently elicits curiosity by introducing secondary
 characters- Louis Bernard, the Draytons, the assassin, Ambrose Chappell,
 Jr. -in this obtuse fashion.) It is this combination of transparency and opacity,
 couched in a pattern of spatial attachment that emphasizes the McKennas, that
 creates the sense that narrative information is being "filtered" through the
 McKennas.29
 Up until the murder of Louis Bernard, the McKennas have functioned as
 an "alignment unit"; that is, the narration has followed them as a couple with
 much of our access to their thoughts deriving from dialogue between them. The
 murder results in the splitting of this unit, aligning us more closely with Ben
 McKenna during the murder and in its immediate aftermath. The murder
 scene is one of the few occasions within this first movement when the narrative
 attaches us to action other than that involving the McKennas, and yet, at
 the same time, it ultimately functions to underscore our alignment with Ben
 McKenna. Since these are, on the face of it, contrary effects, a more detailed
 examination of the sequence is warranted.
 The action takes place in a marketplace, where the McKennas are spending
 a leisurely morning with the Draytons. The narration first aligns us with the
 McKennas. The Draytons are looking after Hank, and this second group occa-
 sionally crosses the path of the McKennas. The narration then breaks with this
 restriction in order to follow a scuffle and chase that erupts in the market: Louis
 Bernard is being pursued. Bernard is stabbed, staggers toward the group
 formed by the McKennas and the Draytons, and falls on Ben McKenna.
 Through a sequence of tighter and tighter close-ups and the diminution of back-
 ground noise, the narration attaches us to Ben McKenna's actions and experi-
 ence ever more exclusively. The apex of this movement occurs in a two-shot in
 which the camera tracks in toward the characters as Bernard whispers into Ben's
 ear. Though the shot is not subjective in any obvious sense, it mimics for the
 spectator the way Ben has been drawn down by Bernard. Over these shots, Ber-
 nard communicates some fragmented information regarding the assassination
 plot. The spectator's alignment with Ben is cemented here, since only the spec-
 tator and Ben are party to these revelations. The more omniscient narration
 during the chase that precedes Bernard's death in fact functions to highlight this
 exclusive alignment of the spectator with Ben. In this sense, if we take the se-
 quence as whole, the brief "decentering" of the McKennas only serves to place
 the subsequent narrational isolation of Ben McKenna in relief.
 Following this incident, Ben is interviewed by the police and then receives
 a threatening phone call in which he is informed that Hank has been kid-
 napped. Back at the hotel, he tells Jo about the phone call and his realization
 that the Draytons must have been the agents of the kidnapping, thus reforming
 the earlier "alignment unit." This is crucial in reifying a moral structure in the
 film: from the beginning the McKennas have been presented as a sympathetic
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 couple, but no definitively antipathetic character emerges until this moment.
 The narration sets up a Manichaean moral structure, a simple opposition of
 groups representing opposed values. The narration has provided us with our
 villains -for the moment, at least. The pattern of exclusive spatial attachment to
 the McKennas is important here, since we later discover that Mrs. Drayton is a
 most half-hearted and guilt-ridden kidnapper. But the Hitchcockian narration
 does not reveal this to us at this point, thus inviting the Manichaean response.
 In this way, the alignment structure affects the pattern of moral orientation.
 Distinguishing alignment from allegiance does not at all deny that the two sys-
 tems interact; that is why they are defined as operating within a larger system -
 the structure of sympathy.
 The first movement of the film climaxes with the argument between the
 McKennas in their hotel room in Marrakesh and their telephone call with
 Hank, which follows their arrival at Heathrow Airport in London. As with the
 stabbing scene, these scenes function to concentrate our attention more keenly
 on the characters with whom we are aligned; in this case, both the McKennas.
 Aside from a brief argument with Buchanan, a British police official, the
 McKennas are isolated in these scenes. The narration thus dovetails alignment
 and allegiance: we have been aligned with the McKennas from the beginning of
 the film, a pattern underlined by their isolation in these scenes, and during the
 same portion of the film the moral structure clarifies into a dualistic opposition,
 thus intensifying our sympathy for the McKennas. The text is so organized that
 at precisely the point where our allegiance is most strongly elicited, any "inter-
 ference" from action involving other characters is excluded. The first movement
 of the film, then, leads to this convergence of alignment and allegiance, the op-
 timal conditions for an intense and unqualified sympathetic engagement with
 the McKennas.
 The second movement of the film disperses and fragments this conver-
 gence, all the time maintaining our sympathetic engagement with the McKennas.
 Within the structure of alignment, this dispersal occurs as the narration be-
 comes increasingly omniscient. In our terms, the narration attaches us to mul-
 tiple characters and, again in contrast to the first movement of the film, gives us
 access to the subjectivities of characters other than the McKennas. The once-
 exclusive pattern of attachment splinters in two ways: Ben and Jo search for
 Hank separately, effecting a sustained (rather than temporary, as in the
 first movement of the film) spatial division of the sympathetic characters. Sec-
 ond, and more important, the narration now periodically aligns us with the
 Draytons, beginning with the sequence in which the assassin is instructed by
 Mr. Drayton. Up to this point in the film, the narration has only momentarily
 strayed from aligning us with either Ben or Ben and Jo together.
 This increasing omniscience does not only manifest itself in the attachment
 to a greater number of characters than in the first movement of the film. This
 shift is mirrored by a change in the texture of the narration (that is, the quality
 of the narration on a shot-by-shot, "micro" level, as opposed to its global qualities
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 established across entire segments), which self-consciously interrupts the flow
 of character action and reaction by foregrounding inanimate elements of the di-
 egesis of which the characters are unaware. The most striking case involves the
 stuffed animals that intrude upon our attention when Ben visits the taxidermists
 in search of Hank, commenting ironically on the misperception - shared by Ben
 and, by virtue of the structure of alignment, the spectator-of the Chappells as
 a gang of menacing criminals.
 Parallel with these shifts in the structure of alignment, the narration also
 complicates the moral structure of the film. In aligning the spectator with the
 Draytons in the scene in which the assassin receives his instructions, the nar-
 ration posits a new moral opposition among the kidnappers, between Mrs.
 Drayton, kind and protective toward Hank, on the one hand, and Mr. Drayton,
 the assassin and Hank's guard, on the other. The opposition mirrors the larger
 one that crystallizes at the end of the first movement between the McKennas
 and the Draytons. The film thus effects a series of reversals with respect to Mrs.
 Drayton, switching from antipathy to sympathy twice (the other instance occurs
 earlier in the film). The split between the Draytons performs an even more
 complex function in the way that it parallels and overshadows a more subtle di-
 vision that opens up between Ben and Jo McKenna." After the kidnapping, the
 domineering, controlling traits of Ben McKenna take on a much more troubling
 and unsympathetic aspect. Up to this point, the difficulties caused in the mar-
 riage by Ben's "benign" patriarchal dominance have been revealed in dialogue -
 most obviously in references to Jo's unwillingly abandoned singing career-but
 largely anesthetized by the ludic tone of the family scenes. After the kidnap-
 ping, however, Ben's control over Jo is cast in a more sinister light, particularly
 in the scene in which he cajoles her into taking tranquilizers. A major thematic
 concern of the second movement of the film is the (relative) re-empowerment of
 Jo McKenna within the marriage--she is proven to be at least as capable and
 insightful in the "masculine" business of the hunt for the kidnappers -and the
 consequent renewal of the marriage. However, in moral terms, this division is
 very minor compared with that between the McKennas and the Draytons and
 the new split between Mr. and Mrs. Drayton. The latter plays out in more
 extreme form and yet diminishes by comparison the conflict between the
 McKennas. None of these intricacies undermine our sympathy for the McKennas
 as a couple, and it is in this sense that they remain the moral center of the film.
 The narration manages to introduce moral complexity with respect to the pro-
 tagonists without undermining the strong "melodramatic" opposition set up in
 the first movement.
 Some of the consequences of these complications in the patterns of align-
 ment and allegiance are manifested in the climactic scene in the embassy.
 Mr. Drayton leaves the basement of the embassy to fetch Hank from the room
 upstairs in which he is being held by Mrs. Drayton. He is planning to strangle
 Hank. In the next shot, Ben heads up the stairs of the embassy from the ground
 floor, following the sound of his son whistling "Que Sera." The narration then
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 cuts to Mrs. Drayton in the room with Hank. She is desperately trying to save
 him. Someone starts to pound on the door. Is it Ben or Mr. Drayton? Our hes-
 itation is integral to the effect of suspense, but what I am interested in here are
 the factors that bear on our hypotheses. Inference based on narrative context
 should lead us to the conclusion that it is Ben at the door: Ben surely has less
 ground to cover, since he begins from the ground floor rather than the base-
 ment. Against this, however, two factors point to Mr. Drayton. The moral op-
 position between the Draytons is important because, generically, we expect a
 confrontation between a sympathetic and an antipathetic character.31 On these
 grounds, then, it is likely to be Mr. Drayton, who has become the moral oppo-
 nent of Mrs. Drayton, rather than Ben.
 The second factor likely to weight our hypotheses in favor of Mr. Drayton
 involves a form of central imagining, or empathy, in contrast to the acentral phe-
 nomena on which this analysis has concentrated. "Affective mimicry" describes
 our capacity to gauge the affective states of others through facial and bodily
 cues, rapidly and with little or no knowledge of context. The process is central
 because the gauging involves a partial replication of the observed person's facial
 expression and bodily gesture, which in turn, through "feedback," results in a
 mimicking of the target subject's affective state, not merely a recognition of it.32
 Affective mimicry functions in practical existence as a kind of "sixth sense," an
 almost "perceptual" registering and reflexive mimicry of the emotion of another
 person via facial and bodily cues, a physiological mechanism by which we con-
 stantly probe the meaning of our environment. It is quite distinct from the cog-
 nitive, acentral assessments of a character's affective state-of the type that form
 the basis of the structure of sympathy-in that it does not rely upon narrative
 context. Nevertheless, the information provided by affective mimicry must be
 integrated with the spectator's existing knowledge of the narrative context. In
 this case, we may mimic the fear clearly expressed by Mrs. Drayton's facial and
 bodily gestures, the fear reinforcing the expectation, based on conventional pat-
 terns of allegiance, that it is Mr. Drayton at the door. It is my experience that for
 most spectators, the combined effects of allegiance and mimicry override the
 purely cognitive assessment of narrative space. Thus, the information provided
 by the mechanism of central imagining in this case meshes with the structure of
 sympathy.3
 The second movement of the film thus complicates the pattern of moral
 orientation, without displacing the McKennas as the moral center of the film,
 and replaces an exclusive alignment with the McKennas with a structure
 of alignment in which we are alternately aligned with Jo McKenna, Ben
 McKenna, and the kidnappers. These shifts occur for the sake of generating sus-
 pense. The first movement, however, is important to the creation of this sus-
 pense in a different way. The exclusive alignment with the McKennas,
 combined with the Manichaean moral structure, create the optimal conditions
 for an intense, sympathetic engagement with them. This emotional bond car-
 ries through the second movement of the film in spite of the self-conscious,
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 mocking interventions of the narration, ensuring that when the narration does
 disperse our attention by developing an alternating alignment pattern, we still
 care enough about the characters to want a good outcome for them. To borrow
 a phrase from detective fiction writer P. D. James, suspense depends on both
 devices and desires.
 A number of points regarding the structure of sympathy in general emerge
 from this analysis of The Man Who Knew Too Much. First, in contrast to the
 everyday model of identification, engagement within the structure of sympathy
 is conceived as a plural phenomenon. According to the casual scenario of char-
 acter identification, we watch a film and find ourselves becoming attached to a
 particular character on the basis of qualities roughly congruent with those we
 possess, or wish to possess, and experience vicariously the emotional states of
 this character: we identify with him or her. It should now be clear that this sce-
 nario conflates many different kinds of response to character, some purely cog-
 nitive, some both cognitive and affective, and implies that this articulation of
 the various kinds of response is the only significant one. Our examination of The
 Man Who Knew Too Much illustrates the way in which spectators may recog-
 nize, align, and ally themselves with characters in complex patterns that may
 preclude or transcend a single, strong engagement ("identification") with a sin-
 gle character. One of the advantages of positing a number of different levels of
 engagement is that we can see how our relationship with a central character is
 inflected by adjacent engagements at the same or different levels that may com-
 pete or cooperate with a dominant engagement. Broadly speaking, plural en-
 gagement can work in two ways. We may respond differently to the same
 character at different points in the film, as, strikingly, in the case of Mrs. Dray-
 ton, and we may engage simultaneously with different characters in different
 ways within a given part of the film. Plural "identification" - the ramification of
 character engagement through the variables of level of engagement, number of
 characters, and time - lies at the heart of the complexity of experience that nar-
 rative fiction can offer us.
 In spite of this, the great bulk of theoretical speculation on the question of
 "identification" has been concerned with sympathetic reactions to characters re-
 flecting the values already held (consciously or unconsciously) by the spectator
 (which should hardly surprise us, since this is the relationship built in to the
 word "identification"). And this is another good reason to drop the term in favor
 of another, more neutral term, like engagement. For engaging with characters
 may result in--if I may risk a hideous neologism -"alterification" at least as
 much as "identification"; narratives (including popular ones) are not only about
 reconfirming and restaging the familiar, the same old story. The interest and
 fascination of narratives may well derive equally from the representation of the
 unfamiliar, the spectator's "quasi-experience" of the new. The Man Who Knew
 Too Much draws upon stereotypical types and narrative patterns and yet, un-
 questionably, it engages our interest by eliciting sympathetic (and antipathetic)
 responses toward characters undergoing experiences of traumatic loss, viola-
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 tion, and self-questioning that few of us will have direct experience of, and none
 in the precise configuration put forward by the narrative. Fiction enables, in
 Stephen Greenblatt's words, a kind of imaginative mobility that has been almost
 entirely obscured by the stress on "subjection" (ideological determination) in
 contemporary theory. I must stress that I am not appealing to a notion of imag-
 ination or aesthetic experience that takes us beyond or outside the social, but
 rather one that fosters new perspectives on the social, one that facilitates imag-
 inative mobility within social "space."34
 A further feature of the structure of sympathy that emerges from the anal-
 ysis of The Man Who Knew Too Much is that the three basic levels of engage-
 ment may interact in various ways. Traditional aesthetic concepts, such as
 "empathy" (in the Brechtian sense) and catharsis, may be explained with more
 precision in terms of such complex patterns of engagement. But it is important
 here to recognize that the three basic levels, though they always interact in ac-
 tual films, are distinct phenomena which should not be conflated. Maniac
 (William Lustig, 1982), for example, develops an alignment pattern in which the
 narration attaches us to a subjectively transparent protagonist whose actions (a
 series of horrible rapes, murders, and scalpings) are morally repugnant, deny-
 ing most viewers the necessary conditions for a sympathetic allegiance with the
 character. We are, as it were, made to "identify" informationally with a charac-
 ter from whom we are simultaneously emotionally alienated. The distinction
 between alignment and allegiance attempts to capture this split. This is not to
 deny that structures of alignment may have an impact on structures of alle-
 giance, as we saw with respect to our changing evaluations of Mrs. Drayton. But
 this is quite different from collapsing the various concepts that comprise the
 model of character engagement back into a single, homogeneous phenomenon,
 just as there is a difference between, on the one hand, mistaking the wood for
 the trees and, on the other hand, acknowledging that there are both a wood and
 several varieties of trees.
 A Concluding Conundrum. An exhaustive treatment of psychoanalytic ap-
 proaches to "identification" and the relationship of such approaches to a cogni-
 tive model of the type proposed here is beyond the scope of this essay, but I
 want to conclude with a few remarks on this subject. At a very general level,
 there are connections between certain psychoanalytic theories and the model of
 engagement. Most obviously, there is a broad kinship between my approach
 and those psychoanalytic models that stress "multiple identificatory positions"
 where that process is understood to involve a mixture of central and acentral
 imagining-as, for example, in the works of Janet Bergstrom, Elizabeth Cowie,
 Carol Clover, and Richard Allen.35 And it might seem that by breaking down
 "identification" into its constituent senses my work could usefully complement
 the broad focus of psychoanalysis on questions of gender and fantasy with a for-
 malist concern for precise textual description. But this may be too sanguine,
 and it is certainly too simple. Let me approach the problems of such a shotgun
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 marriage between psychoanalysis and character engagement by considering
 (optical) POV, a subject that looms large in most accounts of "identification."
 I have already suggested that the functions of POV are far more diverse
 than criticism often allows. What is key here, however, is that a POV shot might
 function solely to give us access to the thoughts of a character; that is, it might
 produce alignment without allegiance. For many psychoanalytic film theorists,
 however, POV is inseparable from allegiance. Laura Mulvey treats the POV shot
 as central to the masculine address of classical cinema, articulating scopophilia
 more clearly than any other device. Rather than being conceived as a tool that is
 used for a variety of human needs and purposes, looking is inextricably bound
 up with the development of sexual difference and the inequities of power under
 patriarchy. POV, as the pre-eminent cinematic device for the representation of
 looking, is thus intrinsically value-laden; indeed, Mulvey talks of the spectator
 of Vertigo being caught in the "moral ambiguity" of looking.3 Similarly, for Jac-
 queline Rose, intrinsic to the shot/reverse-shot structure is an aggressivity char-
 acteristic of the mirror-phase, which the filmic structure echoes and restages.37
 In common with Baudry and Metz, Rose assumes here that the cinematic ap-
 paratus itself is to be explained in psychoanalytic terms, as a replaying of the
 mirror-phase (though for Rose the apparatus produces a specifically gendered
 subject). The result, I would argue, is that certain devices are essentialized; that
 is, they perform fixed psychic functions regardless of (or, at best, in addition to)
 the particular material of the narrative or the cultural context of their use.
 Like these psychoanalytic theories, the model of character engagement ad-
 vanced here attempts to construct a general theory of a particular aspect of cin-
 ema. It attempts to lay out a set of levels and distinctions that will be pertinent
 to the characterological structures of fiction films of all societies, though it ac-
 knowledges that for each concrete case these general structures require "filling-
 out" with the particular representational concerns and conventions of the
 society in question. Within this framework, ideology is understood as emerging
 from the concrete uses of devices and structures in particular contexts, by par-
 ticular agents, and directed toward specific ends." It is with respect to this
 issue that the crucial difference between character engagement and psycho-
 analytic approaches becomes clear. For many psychoanalytic film theorists, the
 cinematic apparatus as such--or, indeed, narrative form as such--is "always al- ready" ideological (whether that ideology is conceived as bourgeois or patriar-
 chal). In Rose's words, a certain ideology is "latent" in the system of "cinematic
 specularity" itself.39 The cinematic apparatus is not a technology that only be-
 comes ideological when it is used for certain goals, representing particular sub-
 ject matter in specific ways.
 I would not dispute that the cinema, as a technology, emerges from a bour-
 geois and patriarchal society, but I would argue that the potential uses and ef-
 fects of a technology may outstrip its origins, and that this is certainly the case
 with the ideological effects of cinema. Mulvey's argument can only be inte-
 grated with such a view of cinematic technology by construing it as a historical
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 and cultural claim which addresses the way in which certain devices (like POV
 shots) have been used in the service of certain ideological purposes (the func-
 tion of the POV shot to represent scopophilia as an aspect of Western patriarchy,
 for example). This allows us to recognize the massive variety of other functions
 performed by POV: the representation of the focused hatred of a peasant toward
 a factory owner in The End of St. Petersburg (V. I. Pudovkin, 1927), for exam-
 ple, or, to take an example from classical cinema, the representation of a char-
 acter's longing for drinking water in Lifeboat (Hitchcock, 1944). If the various
 psychoanalytic theories of cinema are to represent themselves as more general
 theories, then they must show how scopophilia or voyeurism illuminates such
 instances of POV.4?
 This approach allows for the concepts of psychoanalysis at the historical and
 cultural level-treating, as I have already suggested, the particular function of
 POV in representing scopophilia as a cultural phenomenon under the rubric of
 allegiance. Rather than being seen as an explanation of patriarchy, psychoanal-
 ysis is viewed as an expression of it, an extension of themes and imagery con-
 cerning sexual difference already present in the culture. Mulvey herself is very
 explicit about the limited validity of psychoanalysis as a tool of polemic against
 patriarchy on precisely these grounds. Psychoanalysis, Mulvey might be under-
 stood to be saying, is valuable in an analysis of patriarchal cinema in that it pre-
 sents us with an elaboration of the very ideology - the system of beliefs and
 values that shores up the power structure - out of which classical cinema arises.
 This does not deprive it of all explanatory value, but it does constrain it to the
 cultural level. There is no "refusal of difference" in this position; my analysis of
 The Man Who Knew Too Much did address, and would certainly be compatible
 with an analysis stressing, the place of patriarchy in the film. It is simply a ques-
 tion of situating questions of difference (sexual and otherwise) at a different (cul-
 tural rather than universal) level than much of psychoanalytic film theory has
 done.
 If psychoanalysis is so placed, then claims based on it must be regarded as
 a part of the larger phenomenon of character engagement, rather than subsum-
 ing it. And this, it seems to me, is the crux of the difficulty, because most the-
 orists who appeal to psychoanalysis regard it as a general theory of human
 identity, not simply a cluster of cultural beliefs. My approach would at best sus-
 pend judgment on whether such concepts as repression and the unconscious
 have scientific validity (that is, whether they are true beliefs, rather than simply
 beliefs). But most psychoanalytic film theorists would be unhappy with such a
 neutered beast and would wish to ascribe far more explanatory power to it than
 at a "merely" cultural and historical level. Moreover, if my skepticism about the
 universal validity of psychoanalysis turns out to be wrong, then the prospects for
 a fusion of the model set out here with psychoanalysis are still poor. If looking is
 intrinsically value-laden in the way that psychoanalytic film theory suggests,
 then my efforts to separate alignment from allegiance and to treat the represen-
 tation of scopophilia as merely one function of POV--albeit an important one in
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 our culture--may be ill-conceived. What I am proposing as a solution to this
 impasse, then, is that the cognitive model advanced here incorporate psycho-
 analytic notions as a set of contingent historical beliefs, which are then treated
 as functioning in a cognitive fashion. While I doubt that this will be universally
 accepted, it is, at least, one way of finding an interface between the two para-
 digms. Obviously, I don't pretend to have a final answer to this question, but the
 difficulties of yoking the two approaches in other ways should not be under-
 estimated. One thing is clear: nothing is to be gained from either simple stipu-
 lations of the absolute truth of one theory or another or mere gestures of
 pluralistic goodwill.
 Notes
 Thanks to my two anonymous readers for their comments and suggestions.
 1. "Character, Agency, and Mimesis," paper delivered at the Society for Cinema Stud-
 ies Conference, New Orleans, February 1993; a fuller version will appear in Engag-
 ing Characters: Fiction and Emotional Response in the Cinema (Oxford: Clarendon
 Press, forthcoming).
 2. Two works are particularly important in advancing a view of imagination that see it as
 central to human rationality and productivity: George Lakoff, Women, Fire and
 Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of
 Chicago Press, 1987); and, from a more purely philosophical perspective, David No-
 vitz, Knowledge, Fiction and the Imagination (Philadelphia: Temple University
 Press, 1987).
 3. The notion of "quasi-observation" is posited by Jean-Paul Sartre in The Psychology
 of the Imagination (London: Methuen, 1972), trans. unknown, and developed by
 Paul Taylor, who writes of "quasi-experience" in "Imagination and Information,"
 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (1981): 211-14.
 4. Edward Branigan, Point of View in the Cinema: A Theory of Narration and Subjec-
 tivity in the Classic Film (New York: Mouton, 1984), 40.
 5. Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
 Press, 1984), 74.
 6. The linguistic distinction is made in Richard Wollheim, On Art and the Mind (Cam-
 bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 59, not in The Thread of Life. The
 distinction should not be confused with the one made by Wollheim in the latter
 work, in which similar linguistic cues are used to suggest a broader distinction be-
 tween iconic and noniconic mental states.
 Furthermore, Wollheim does not contend that there is a lawlike relation be-
 tween the two forms of linguistic expression and the two types of imagination (cen-
 tral and acentral); the linguistic distinction functions merely as a heuristic.
 Wollheim makes a further subdivision within central imagining, between cen-
 tral (where the position occupied is that of a central figure in the imagined scenario)
 and peripheral imagining (where the position occupied is that of a minor figure
 within the imagined scenario). For example, in imagining a wedding, we could cen-
 trally imagine it from the position of the bride (central) or from the position of a
 member of the congregation (peripheral). The major divide lies between these two
 forms of imagining and acentral imagining.
 7. Ibid., 75.
 8. I add this second example in order to make it clear that central imagining is not a
 synonym for mental visualizing, though the latter can be an example of central imag-
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 ining. This is a problem because of the visual bias embedded in the "imagination"
 word group and because many authors, Wollheim included, choose to discuss these
 broader concepts with examples which involve visualization.
 9. The distinction is not dissimilar to that between sympathy and empathy, as those
 terms are often defined. I regard acentral imagining as cognate with sympathy,
 while central imagining is a type of empathy. However, because of the great vari-
 ety of senses attaching to "empathy" and "sympathy" in the vernacular, I shall re-
 frain from using them until I have clarified my position with less encumbered
 terminology.
 10. See, for example, the quotations collected in Leo Handel, Hollywood Looks at Its
 Audience (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950), 147-49.
 11. Robin Wood, Hitchcock's Films (London: Tantivy Press, 1966), 129.
 12. Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Screen 16: 3 (Autumn
 1975): 12.
 13. Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier, trans. Celia
 Britton, Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster, and Alfred Guzzetti (London: Macmillan
 Press, 1983), 55-56.
 14. Elizabeth Cowie, "Fantasia," m/f 9 (1984): 101. For a similar argument, see Janet
 Bergstrom, "Enunciation and Sexual Difference," Camera Obscura 3-4 (Summer
 1979): 57-58. Linda Williams also stresses divided and multiple "identifications" in
 "Something Else Besides a Mother: Stella Dallas and the Maternal Melodrama,"
 Cinema Journal 24: 1 (1984): 2-27.
 15. Carol Clover, Men, Women and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film
 (London: BFI, 1992), 12.
 16. Carroll is also reacting against "illusion" theories of cinematic spectatorship, that is,
 theories, like psychoanalysis, that argue that we are deceived into taking a represen-
 tation for its referents in classical cinema, or cinema more generally. For Carroll,
 "identification" implies not only central imagining but a loss of awareness that one is
 imagining at all, displaced by a "hallucination" of actually being the character. But
 there are two issues here, and it is important not to confuse them. First, there is the
 question of whether a spectator mistakes a representation for an actual referent. Sec-
 ond, we can ask whether the spectator, in engaging with fiction, imagines the events
 centrally (a claim usually indicated by a term like "empathy" or "identification") or
 acentrally (as in Carroll's "assimilation"). In answer to the first question, I assume
 that spectators are not subject to an illusion of this sort. But this is not the issue
 under scrutiny, and our answer to the first question does not determine our answer
 to the second question. Often the "illusion" theory of fiction is yoked with a notion
 of identification: not only do we mistake the representation for its referent(s), but we
 mistake ourselves for (or "lose ourselves in") the protagonist (or some other charac-
 ter). But there is no necessary connection here. It is quite possible to conceive of a
 spectator centrally imagining while never mistaking representation for referent, just
 as it is possible for us to imagine what another person must feel like in their situa-
 tion, without for a moment confusing ourselves with that other person.
 I should note here that my categorization of Carroll within Wollheim's scheme
 is of my own doing. Carroll makes no reference to the work of Wollheim. See
 The Philosophy of Horror; or, Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: Routledge, 1990),
 63-68.
 17. I am using and developing a scenario initially used by Kendall Walton ("Fearing Fic-
 tions," Journal of Philosophy 75: 1 [January 1978]: 5-27) that has since become a
 touchstone in the debate on emotional response to fiction. Carroll develops his own
 argument partly in reference to the case of Charles and the Green Slime.
 18. Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, 95-96, emphasis added.
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 19. The only occasion when Carroll develops an example that clearly would count as an
 instance of central imagining can be found in ibid., 80. Here he introduces his
 "thought theory" of emotional response to fiction. One of his initial examples is that
 of walking near a cliff and imagining slipping and falling down the cliff face. Intu-
 itively, we know that such imagined events can frighten us and do not depend at all
 on likelihood: one need not believe that one is in any real danger of slipping in order
 to frighten oneself with the thought.
 Now this is clearly central imagining, outside a fictional context. When Carroll
 moves on to discuss fiction, however, the paradigm becomes acentral imagining. At
 no point does Carroll suggest, for example, that Charles might frighten himself by
 imagining himself as a character faced by the Green Slime. Rather, sharing the per-
 tinent cultural assumptions and categories with the character, Charles too is dis-
 gusted by the interstitial monster. Hence, his emotional evaluations and arousals are
 "parallel" (Noel Carroll, Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary
 Film Theory [New York: Columbia University Press, 1988], 247) but are not gener-
 ated by a process of central imagining.
 One clarification is important regarding Carroll's use of the phrase "point of
 view" in this passage. Carroll is not suggesting that we first centrally imagine the
 event and then acentrally imagine it. Understanding the situation from the charac-
 ter's "point of view," in Carroll's sense, entails only an understanding of the interests
 and judgments of the character. This is clear when Carroll writes that assimilation
 requires that spectators have "a sense of the character's internal understanding of the
 situation" but that spectators "need not replicate the mental state of the protagonist,
 but only know reliably how she assesses it [the situation]" (Carroll, The Philosophy
 of Horror, 95). Thus, in Alien (Ridley Scott, 1979), we understand the situation from
 the "point of view" of Sigourney Weaver insofar as we understand that the fear she
 experiences arises because she judges that the alien is revolting and dangerous and
 because she sees it as being in her interest to preserve her life. We do not need to
 experience the occurrent emotion of fear in order to understand the situation "in-
 ternally." The phrase "'point of view," in other words, has a very different meaning
 for Wollheim and Carroll, respectively, and I do not take it to mean anything akin to
 "central imagining" for Carroll.
 20. Carroll, Mystifying Movies, 247.
 21. Christopher Butler, Interpretation, Deconstruction and Ideology (Oxford: Claren-
 don Press, 1984), 7; see also David Bordwell, Making Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.:
 Harvard University Press, 1989), 134-35, 171.
 22. George Wilson, Narration in Light (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
 1986) uses the phrase "epistemic alignment" in a similar way, although he does not
 develop the concept systematically, in the way I attempt to in this study. I adopt the
 notion of "spatial attachment" from Boris Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition,
 trans. Valentina Zavarin and Susan Wittig, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
 1973), 58.
 23. Elena Dagrada discusses a parodic instance of this convention in The Nutty Profes-
 sor (Jerry Lewis, 1962), in "The Diegetic Look: Pragmatics of the Point-of-View
 Shot," Iris 4: 2 (1986): 120.
 24. The term "allegiance," and the idea of moral structure are posited by Noel Carroll in
 "Toward a Theory of Film Suspense," Persistence of Vision 1 (Summer 1984): 65-89.
 I choose to follow Carroll in using the word "moral" rather than "ideological" to de-
 scribe this level of engagement for two reasons. First, the overall ideology of a text
 may involve many factors other than those pertaining to the characterological struc-
 ture of the text; and second, with respect to characters, ideological judgments are
 typically expressed as moral evaluations.
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 25. This "cognitive" or "judgmentalist" view of emotions derives ultimately from Aris-
 totle, although it has many modern exponents, from psychologists like Schacter and
 Singer and George Mandler to philosophers such as O. H. Green. Patricia
 Greenspan's Emotions and Reasons (New York: Routledge, 1988) has been particu-
 larly influential on my work.
 26. I do not mean to imply that the spectator's understanding and evaluation of the traits
 of a character must be either complete or immutable in order for allegiance to occur,
 but merely that at a given moment in the text the spectator must believe that s/he
 has some basis for evaluation in the form of beliefs about what traits, etc., comprise
 the character in question.
 27. Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, 96.
 28. Wood, Hitchcock's Films, 23; see also Raymond Durgnat, The Strange Case of
 Alfred Hitchcock (London: Faber, 1974), and Carroll, "Toward a Theory of Film
 Suspense."
 29. Except in the case of POV shots and diegetic voice-overs, film cannot filter narrative
 information through a character in the direct fashion of a literary narrative written in
 the voice of a homodiegetic narrator. In film, the "filtering" effect is the product of
 the particular organization of alignment discussed here.
 30. On the parallels between the McKennas and the Draytons, see Dave Kehr, "Hitch's
 Riddle," Film Comment 20: 5 (May-June 1984): 15.
 31. Carroll, "Toward a Theory of Film Suspense," 71-73.
 32. The facial feedback thesis holds that in adopting a facial expression apposite to a par-
 ticular emotion, our subjective experience of the emotion is intensified. See Paul
 Ekman, ed., Emotion in the Human Face (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
 1982); R. B. Zajonc, "Emotion and Facial Efference: A Theory Reclaimed," Science,
 April 5, 1985, 15-21; Robert Gordon, The Structure of Emotions (Cambridge: Cam-
 bridge University Press, 1987); and Douglas Chismar, "Empathy and Sympathy: The
 Important Difference," Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (1988): 257--66.
 33. Though there are instances where the effects of affective mimicry and the structure
 of sympathy cut against one another; see the analysis of Saboteur (Hitchcock, 1941)
 in my forthcoming Engaging Characters.
 34. See Stephen Greenblatt, "Culture," in Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. Frank
 Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990),
 232.
 35. Bergstrom, "Enunciation and Sexual Difference"; Cowie, "Fantasia"; Clover, Men,
 Women and Chainsaws; and Richard Allen, "Representation, Illusion and the Cin-
 ema," Cinema Journal 32: 2 (Winter 1993).
 36. Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," 16.
 37. Jacqueline Rose, "Paranoia and the Film System," Screen 17: 4 (Winter 1976-77).
 38. A similar position is taken by Noel Carroll; see his comments on the cinematic
 image, narrative, and narrational form in Mystifying Movies, 106, 146, and 158,
 respectively.
 39. Rose writes: "paranoia [of which aggressivity is a feature] could be said to be latent
 to the structure of cinematic specularity in itself"' ("Paranoia and the Film System," 89).
 40. It might be argued that the most sophisticated exemplars of psychoanalytic film
 theory do just what I am arguing. Mulvey qualifies the authority of psychoanalysis
 by pointing to the fact that it is a part of patriarchy, not outside it ("Visual Pleasure
 and Narrative Cinema," 7), while Mary Ann Doane is insistent that "we might
 privilege Freudian psychoanalysis because it makes the cultural construction of
 femininity more legible ... psychoanalysis is not used in the traditional sense in
 which one might activate it as a pure or neutral metalanguage" (The Desire to Desire
 [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987], 20-21). On the other hand, neither
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 take the position that psychoanalysis is wholly historical and ideological. So the
 crunch question is: what bits of the theory are historical and ideological, what bits
 are more incorrigible - universal features of human development? And how are we
 to disentangle the one from the other?
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